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# The Socioeconomic Implications of Boko Haram, Banditry, and Insecurity in Nigeria (2010–2021)

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**Abstract**
*The comatose situation Nigeria finds itself in, in the battle against insecurity perpetuated by armed terror groups, has distracted the country in its journey towards development. The recurring cycle of insecurity has threatened the stability and prosperity of the country as since the country's independence in 1960, no republic as gone by without an outbreak of armed violence. As a foundational issue in the polity of the nation, it has profoundly impacted the nation's socioeconomic fabric, and most responses by the government and international community have somewhat successful certain aspects required further consideration. Leveraging on the deprivation theory and the conflict theory the research looks at socioeconomic conditions as a push factor for insecurity. By employing a descriptive survey design and leveraging both primary and secondary data, the research identifies key drivers of insecurity, including governance deficits, poverty, and inequality as a push factor. The study concludes by emphasizing the urgent need for robust security reforms that not only address emerging security threats but also tackle the underlying issues that make citizens vulnerable as recruits and targets for perpetuating violence.*

**Keywords**: Insecurity; Banditry; Terrorism; State capacity; Socio-economy

## Introduction

Security remains one of the most fundamental prerequisites for socioeconomic development in any society. The absence of security undermines economic productivity, weakens social cohesion, discourages investment, and threatens the legitimacy of state institutions. In Nigeria, the period between 2010 and 2021 witnessed an unprecedented escalation of insecurity arising from Boko Haram insurgency, armed banditry, kidnapping, communal conflicts, and other violent criminal activities. These security challenges significantly altered the socioeconomic landscape of the country, particularly in the northern regions where violence became widespread and persistent.

Among the numerous security threats confronting Nigeria during this period, Boko Haram emerged as one of the most destructive. Although the group originated in Borno State in the early 2000s under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, it transformed into a full-scale insurgent movement following the death of its founder in 2009. Since then, the group has carried out numerous attacks on civilians, security formations, educational institutions, religious centres, and government facilities across northeastern Nigeria. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2021), the insurgency resulted in the displacement of more than two million persons, making it one of Africa's most severe humanitarian crises.

Beyond the activities of Boko Haram, northwestern Nigeria experienced a dramatic rise in armed banditry. Initially associated with cattle rustling and rural criminality, bandit groups evolved into highly organized networks involved in mass abductions, village raids, extortion, illegal mining, and violent attacks on farming communities. States such as Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Kaduna, and Niger became epicentres of bandit violence. The proliferation of small arms, weak governance structures, widespread poverty, youth unemployment, and porous borders contributed significantly to the expansion of these criminal networks (International Crisis Group, 2020).

The socioeconomic consequences of these security challenges have been profound. Agriculture, which constitutes the primary source of livelihood for millions of Nigerians in the affected regions, experienced severe disruption as farmers abandoned their lands due to fear of attacks. Trade routes became increasingly unsafe, transportation costs rose, businesses relocated or closed operations, and local markets suffered significant losses. The disruption of economic activities contributed to rising poverty levels, food insecurity, unemployment, and declining household incomes.

The World Bank (2020) observed that conflict and insecurity remain major impediments to poverty reduction and sustainable development in Nigeria.

The effects of insecurity have extended beyond economic losses to include substantial social consequences. Millions of individuals have been displaced from their homes, educational activities have been interrupted, healthcare services have deteriorated, and community structures have been weakened. The abduction of schoolchildren in states such as Borno, Kaduna, Katsina, and Zamfara generated national and international concern regarding the safety of educational institutions. Furthermore, prolonged exposure to violence has produced significant psychological trauma among affected populations, particularly women and children.

Historically, Nigeria's experience with violent extremism predates Boko Haram. The Maitatsine uprisings of the 1980s, recurrent ethno-religious conflicts, and political violence in various parts of the country illustrate longstanding challenges associated with governance, social exclusion, and religious radicalization. Scholars have argued that persistent poverty, unemployment, corruption, inequality, weak institutions, and poor governance create conditions that facilitate the emergence and sustenance of extremist and criminal groups (Awojobi, 2014; Onuoha, 2014). Consequently, insecurity in Nigeria cannot be understood solely through a military lens but must also be viewed as a manifestation of deeper structural and socioeconomic challenges.

The international dimension of the crisis further complicates the security environment. Boko Haram's links with transnational terrorist networks, including the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), as well as the movement of arms and fighters across borders within the Lake Chad Basin, have transformed what began as a domestic insurgency into a regional security challenge. Similarly, the expansion of banditry has been facilitated by transborder criminal activities and weak state presence in rural communities.

Given the scale and persistence of these security threats, understanding their socioeconomic implications has become increasingly important. While considerable attention has been devoted to the security and military dimensions of Boko Haram insurgency and banditry, less emphasis has been placed on their broader effects on economic development, social welfare, human capital formation, and community resilience. This study therefore examines the socioeconomic implications of Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, and insecurity in Nigeria between 2010 and 2021. By analysing the effects of these security challenges on livelihoods, economic activities, social stability, and development outcomes, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of the relationship between insecurity and socioeconomic development in contemporary Nigeria.

## Literature Review

### Concept of Terrorism

Not only has terrorism become a defining issue globally, but it is growing to be a political economy that has profound effects on security, governance, and development. For instance, Merari (1993) describes terrorism not as an arbitrary act of violence but as a calculated method of achieving political aims through fear and disruption. Schmid and Jongman (1998) consider that terrorism is aiming at the disturbance of societal normative systems by means of using violence to instill fear, which is definitely the approach taken in Nigeria by the Boko Haram sect against civilian targets, basic infrastructure, and civilian economic activities.

This security situation has persisted in Nigeria partly because successive governments have failed to reverse deep-seated conditions such as poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion that feed the spiral of violence back. Boko Haram’s insurgency has displaced millions and devastated agriculture, hence contributing to a food crisis in the northeast, adding to the vulnerability and instability of already precarious populations. For instance, Adepelumi (2018) argues that effective policies directed at this menace must go beyond military intervention and confrontation into addressing the broader psychological and economic impacts of insurgency on affected communities. The impact of insurgencies in Mali and Somalia provides a sobering context in relation to the incidence of Nigeria. Examples of these can be seen in both countries that have witnessed how long-standing violence has disrupted trade, destabilized governance structures, and devastated livelihoods. These draw a limelight into the necessity of adopting one multi-faceted approach to insecurity through another that does not have a limited focus on military solutions but integrates development and social cohesion efforts.

The paper draws on an extensive body of research and literature relating to terrorism, such as Merari’s 1993 work comparing and contrasting terrorism with other forms of conflict and Schmid and Jongman’s 1998 definition of terrorism as the unlawful and aggressive use of violence to coerce governments or individuals to change behavior. This understanding of terrorism is important in gauging the scope of activities that Boko Haram has continued to injure the social and economic fabric of Nigeria. As Ganor (2002) explains, a proper and

objective definition of terrorism can be premised upon accepted international laws and principles regarding what behaviors are permitted in conventional wars between nations as set out in the Geneva and Hague Conventions, which in turn are based upon the basic principle that "the deliberate harming of soldiers during wartime is a necessary evil, and thus permissible, whereas the deliberate targeting of the civilian population is absolutely forbidden" (Ganor, 2002). This thus gives another meaning implied as to what terrorism is, since the author viewed the subject matter of terrorism between interstate attacks, not so much about activities by actors within a state.

In another vein, some scholars considered terrorism from a relativist approach of what it means to the terrorist vis-à-vis the broad description of the concept. There exists this school of thought here that argues that an objective and internationally accepted definition of terrorism can never be arrived at. This is as a result of the notion that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.' The question of who a terrorist is, according to this school of thought, depends entirely on the subjective outlook of the definer.

Thus, while terrorists and their activities are being branded as being harmful to the society, to terrorists themselves such actions are necessary for their survival and in the pursuit of certain well-guarded ideologies. Driving these above analyses home, Ogunrotifa (2013) used an interesting but rather neglected theoretical discussion of Karl Marx's Historical Materialism to shed light on the discourse of terrorism that pervades the contemporary global society and presents a class theory of terrorism based on the study of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It views terrorism as the articulation of an endless class struggle innate in the screened structures of oppression and structured contradictions of the worldwide, dominating capitalist system. The view, therefore, holds that the discursive frame of terrorism cannot be analyzed in isolation from its class nature and the socio-economic conditions that gave rise to it, and any investigation into terrorism has to be strictly confined to the particular context and society that is relevant to the explanation of the action that is to be required to change that context. He concluded that for as long as the endemic socio-economic problems caused by global capitalism remains, the use of individual terrorism will inevitably become a recurrent event or normal social response to the state of affairs.

**Economy of Insecurity**

The phrase 'economy of insecurity' has two connected meanings. It also conceptualizes an economic system which is, in part, dependent on economic insecurity. In essence, it refers to an economic model which prioritizes instability as a key factor in market transactions, allocation of resources and hierarchies. It also suggests a vicious circle, where the economic opportunities created by insecurity are available only to few, while the rest are left to become economically disadvantaged and insecure. In this way, insecurity economically alters the situation but simutaneously also results from the altered situation in an interplay.

The economy of insecurity goes beyond wars and other plainly violent acts. It also includes conditions such as unemployment, poverty or income inequality as these too contribute in some form towards an economy of insecurity. Thus the paradox arises because while people are dependent on industries such as private security and humanitarian aid in the aftermath of wars or civil conflict, these economies are also dependent on the existence of such insecurities in order to stay profitable in the first place.

There are multiple angles to understanding this notion. For instance, Duffield (2010) contends that the global governance systems, particularly in the Global South, are constructed around an economy of insecurity in which the instability of a region serves the economic and strategic pursuits of foreign global actors. Kaldor (2013) on the other hand, highlights the globalization of conflict economies where new wars and localized violence serve greater political and monetary purposes. Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) provide a more complementary explanation and detail the commodification of violence through the anti-terrorism security industries; the privatization of violence and conflicts have created controlled markets where insecurity becomes a commodity.

In Nigeria, the insecurity economy is rather a phenomenon that is real and rampant. For instance, in the Northeastern region of Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency has rendered millions homeless and has created a humanitarian crisis that steadily relies on aid industries, private military contracts, and the small arms trade. In the Niger Delta region, control over resources has resulted in insecurity and further led to a black market for oil stealing and illegal oil refining and arms trafficking. These actions threaten the territorial integrity itself and promote the clandestine economy of the state's weakness. The cities of Lagos and Abuja are further examples of this phenomenon; a decline in job opportunities has led to the emergence of the informal economy of security: private guards and vigilante groups.

The economy of insecurity enables better comprehension of the interaction between the

socially dysfunctional and the economy. It sheds light on how poverty–perpetuating inequalities and political bottled up frustration–ensures the continuity of instability, while pointing to the way such instability is monetized by local and global actors. Understanding this interplay is imperative in designing policies that seek to deal with not only the consequences of the insecurity but also its economic and structural root causes.

**Theoretical Framework**

**Deprivation Theory**

Deprivation theory provides a compelling, human-centered perspective for understanding the rise of Boko Haram. According to Gurr (1970), when people perceive a stark gap between their life expectations and their actual circumstances, frustration and anger emerge, sometimes escalating into violent actions. This sense of deprivation was central to Boko Haram's rise. Mohammed Yusuf, the group's founder, adeptly capitalized on widespread poverty and dissatisfaction, channeling these feelings to recruit followers by offering promises of radical, violent change.

Pia and Diez (2007) emphasize that violence alone does not produce real, lasting change. They argue that for conflict resolution, it must be "de-securitized," meaning that military force alone is insufficient. Addressing underlying issues such as poverty, inequality, and unmet expectations is crucial for sustainable peace. Without tackling the root causes of violence like social exclusion and economic injustice any peace achieved will be fragile and temporary.

**Conflict Theory**

Conflict theory delves into the fundamental societal tensions, particularly as seen in Nigeria's terrorism challenges. It posits that inequality and competing interests inherently drive conflict. Karl Marx and other proponents of this theory demonstrate how social and economic disparities often result in violence. Central to this framework is the concept of relative deprivation, where individuals or groups feel a sense of injustice when their rights be they social, political, or economic are denied, especially while others appear to benefit unfairly.

In Nigeria, many people feel abandoned by the system, both economically and politically, fueling frustration and resentment. These long-standing grievances have directly contributed to Boko Haram's emergence. Widespread anger and inequality drive the tensions that lead to violent conflict. If these deep-rooted issues remain unresolved, the conflict will only worsen, inflicting greater harm and hindering progress toward a stable and cohesive society.

**Empirical review**

In the quest to end insecurity, it is the same as the quest for developments, as terrorism and terrorist organizations have been condemned by many authorities in the international system to be seen in places of intense hunger, poverty and socioeconomic vulnerability. Rogers (2011) argued that many actors in the international system have embarked on several active means to declare and win wars against terrorist groups especially since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. According to Hoffman (2012), the effective policy and efforts in combating the evolving threats of terrorism since the opening decade of the twenty-first century have been adopting a global strategy that is being led by the United States. This has entrenched the idea of protection of national and international security through committed individual and collaborative states' efforts in wagging anti-terrorists' wars (Abbott, Rogers & Sloboda, 2006). The research argued that even in the environment of increasing wars against terrorists, their activities have kept on emerging and escalating in many parts of the world as a result of the divergence of interest of states and non-states actors in certain critical issues of concern. Stressing further, this study focused on significant aspects of Nigeria in reacting to terrorist- related activities concerning the Boko Haram terror organization.

Ewetan (2014) explains that terrorism in Nigeria is not a recent phenomenon, with the Maitatsine Islamic sect being active during Shehu Shagari's presidency in the early 1980s. Similar incidents arose under President Obasanjo's civilian administration, including religious riots in Plateau State. Oviasogie (2013) identifies Northern Nigeria as a hotspot for religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians, fueled by the emergence of diverse Islamic sects that often diverge from mainstream Sufi practices. Philips (2010) highlights the violent religious uprisings by groups like Maitatsine in the 1980s, the Sharia conflicts of the early 2000s, and the Jos crises, all of which caught Nigerian security forces off guard due to their intensity.

The "insecurity market" highlights how socio-economic differences shape the cost of recruiting individuals for violent or destabilizing activities. In Nigeria, poverty and unemployment create an environment where political thuggery and organized violence are alarmingly affordable, with payments as low as $10 to $50 per person. In Southeast Asia, these practices also exist but come at a higher cost due to stronger economies; for instance, political campaign mobilization in Indonesia can exceed $50,000. In China, coercive practices like using "thugs-for-hire" further demonstrate how weak governance and socio-economic challenges fuel these markets, though

specific figures are less documented (AJOL, 2023; New Mandala, 2020; Cambridge Perspectives, 2021).

Modern terror groups, such as Boko Haram, often pursue political agendas under the guise of religion. Mishabu (2010) notes how Niger Delta militants employed terror tactics to demand resource redistribution and global attention, while Boko Haram has engaged in sustained conflict with the Nigerian government since 2009. Terrorism in Nigeria is driven by socio-economic and political factors, with inequity, deprivation, and corruption playing central roles (Osemwegie, 2012; Ewetan & Urhie, 2014). Oviasogie (2013) and Odunfa (2010) argue that systemic corruption and moral decay among leaders have institutionalized inequity, requiring revolutionary changes to reverse this trend.

Lastly, external influences, including terror groups like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Al-Shabab, further embolden impoverished and disillusioned Northern Nigerian Muslims, contributing to escalating violence. The effects of terrorism are widespread, including increased government and private security spending, mass displacement, and strained relations in host communities due to ethnic and religious divides (Ewetan & Urhie, 2014). Odita and Akan (2014) emphasize the economic disruption in the North-East, marked by declining property values, reduced trade, and diminished transportation activity. Arong and Egbere (2013) identify additional consequences such as national income losses, kidnappings, destruction of infrastructure, and job cuts in the oil sector, while Umejei (2011) links terrorism to declining foreign direct investment, making Nigeria increasingly unattractive to investors.

## 3. Research Design and Results

This study adopts a descriptive survey design, facilitating an in-depth analysis of the socioeconomic impacts of insecurity on a geographically dispersed population. Primary data was collected through structured questionnaires and interviews targeting displaced persons, security personnel, and policymakers. Secondary data was sourced from government reports, scholarly articles, and publications by international organizations like the UN and the World Bank. Data analysis employed the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), using percentages and Pearson Chi-Square tests to derive insights and test hypotheses. A case study of Borno State provided a nuanced understanding of the local impacts of insurgency. The use of triangulated data enhanced the validity and reliability of the findings.

**Results presentation and description**

**Table 1: Respondents' Perceptions of the Socioeconomic Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency, Banditry and Insecurity in Nigeria (N = 50)**

| S/N | Statement | SA | A | U | D | SD | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Insecurity has significantly reduced local trade and commercial activities in affected communities. | 20 (40%) | 15 (30%) | 3 (6%) | 7 (14%) | 5 (10%) | 50 (100%) |
| **2** | Agricultural production has declined due to frequent attacks on farming communities. | 24 (48%) | 16 (32%) | 2 (4%) | 5 (10%) | 3 (6%) | 50 (100%) |
| **3** | Insecurity has increased unemployment and reduced income opportunities. | 22 (44%) | 18 (36%) | 2 (4%) | 5 (10%) | 3 (6%) | 50 (100%) |
| **4** | The insurgency has strained relationships among different ethnic and religious communities. | 25 (50%) | 10 (20%) | 2 (4%) | 3 (6%) | 10 (20%) | 50 (100%) |
| **5** | Frequent attacks have discouraged domestic and foreign investment in affected regions. | 21 (42%) | 17 (34%) | 3 (6%) | 6 (12%) | 3 (6%) | 50 (100%) |
| **6** | The displacement of people has negatively affected community development and social welfare. | 26 (52%) | 15 (30%) | 2 (4%) | 4 (8%) | 3 (6%) | 50 (100%) |
| **7** | Educational activities have been disrupted due to insecurity and school closures. | 28 (56%) | 14 (28%) | 1 (2%) | 4 (8%) | 3 (6%) | 50 (100%) |
| **8** | Boko Haram insurgency and banditry have negatively affected the overall Nigerian economy. | 33 (66%) | 7 (14%) | 0 (0%) | 8 (16%) | 2 (4%) | 50 (100%) |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **9** | Government responses have been insufficient in addressing the root causes of insecurity. | 19 (38%) | 16 (32%) | 4 (8%) | 7 (14%) | 4 (8%) | 50 (100%) |
| **10** | Lasting peace requires both military action and socioeconomic development initiatives. | 30 (60%) | 12 (24%) | 1 (2%) | 4 (8%) | 3 (6%) | 50 (100%) |

**Source:** Field Survey, 2024.

**Interpretation of Table 1: Respondents' Perceptions of the Socioeconomic Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency, Banditry and Insecurity in Nigeria**

Table 1 presents respondents' perceptions regarding the socioeconomic implications of Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, and insecurity in Nigeria. The findings reveal that insecurity has had profound effects on economic activities, social relations, and development outcomes in affected communities. With respect to local trade and commercial activities, 70% of respondents either strongly agreed (40%) or agreed (30%) that insecurity has significantly reduced commercial transactions and market activities. This suggests that persistent attacks, road blockages, fear of movement, and market disruptions have adversely affected business operations and local economic exchanges. Only 24% of respondents disagreed with this assertion, while 6% remained undecided. The impact of insecurity on agricultural production was equally significant. A combined 80% of respondents agreed that attacks on farming communities have resulted in declining agricultural productivity. This finding reflects the reality that many farmers have abandoned their farmlands due to fear of attacks, leading to reduced food production and heightened food insecurity in affected regions. Only 16% of respondents disagreed, while 4% remained neutral.

Similarly, the results indicate that insecurity has contributed to rising unemployment and declining income opportunities. Eighty percent of respondents agreed that insecurity has negatively affected employment prospects, while only 16% disagreed. This finding suggests that business closures, disruption of economic activities, and reduced investment have limited livelihood opportunities for residents in affected communities. Regarding social cohesion, 70% of respondents agreed that insurgency and insecurity have strained relationships among ethnic and religious groups. This indicates that prolonged violence has weakened trust, increased suspicion, and created divisions within communities. However, 26% of respondents disagreed with this position, suggesting that the effects on social relations may vary across communities. The findings further reveal that insecurity has discouraged investment. A combined 76% of respondents agreed that recurring violence has negatively affected both domestic and foreign investment in affected regions. Investors are generally reluctant to commit resources to environments characterized by uncertainty and security risks, thereby limiting economic growth and development opportunities. Displacement emerged as one of the most significant consequences of insecurity. A substantial 82% of respondents agreed that the displacement of populations has negatively affected community development and social welfare. The displacement of individuals and families often results in loss of livelihoods, disruption of social networks, increased poverty, and pressure on host communities.

The data also demonstrate that educational activities have been severely affected. Eighty-four percent of respondents agreed that insecurity has disrupted education through school closures, attacks on educational institutions, and the displacement of students and teachers. This finding underscores the long-term developmental implications of insecurity, particularly for human capital formation and future economic productivity.

Concerning the broader economy, 80% of respondents agreed that Boko Haram insurgency and banditry have negatively affected the Nigerian economy. This perception reflects the cumulative effects of reduced agricultural production, declining investment, disruption of trade, increased government security expenditure, and the destruction of infrastructure. On government response, 70% of respondents believed that existing measures have been insufficient in addressing the underlying causes of insecurity. This finding suggests that respondents perceive current interventions as focusing largely on military responses without adequately addressing structural issues such as poverty, unemployment, weak governance, and social exclusion that contribute to insecurity. Finally, an overwhelming majority of respondents (84%) agreed that sustainable peace can only be achieved through a combination of military action and socioeconomic development initiatives. This finding indicates widespread recognition that security challenges require comprehensive approaches that integrate security operations with

economic empowerment, education, social inclusion, and institutional reforms.

Overall, the findings demonstrate that Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, and insecurity have generated extensive socioeconomic consequences in Nigeria. The impacts extend beyond physical violence to include economic decline, social fragmentation, displacement, educational disruption, reduced investment, and weakened development prospects. The results therefore highlight the need for integrated policy responses that address both the immediate security threats and the underlying socioeconomic conditions that sustain insecurity.

**4. Discussion of Findings**

The findings of this study reveal that Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, and other forms of insecurity have generated far-reaching socioeconomic consequences for Borno State and Nigeria more broadly. The survey results demonstrate overwhelming agreement among respondents that insecurity has adversely affected trade, agricultural production, employment opportunities, community relations, educational development, investment flows, and overall economic performance. These findings reinforce the argument that insecurity is not merely a security challenge but a multidimensional development crisis with profound implications for national stability and growth.

The findings are consistent with the assumptions of Relative Deprivation Theory, which posits that perceptions of inequality, exclusion, and deprivation can create conditions conducive to social unrest and violent mobilization. Northern Nigeria has historically experienced higher levels of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and infrastructural deficits compared to many parts of the country. These structural inequalities have created a reservoir of frustration and vulnerability that extremist groups such as Boko Haram have exploited for recruitment and support. The persistence of insecurity therefore reflects not only the activities of armed groups but also deeper socioeconomic conditions that have remained largely unresolved over time.

One of the most significant findings of the study concerns the impact of insecurity on economic activities. The majority of respondents agreed that insecurity has severely disrupted local trade and commercial activities. This finding supports previous studies which argue that violent conflict increases transaction costs, restricts the movement of goods and people, discourages entrepreneurship, and weakens local markets (Awojobi, 2014). Markets that once served as important centres of economic exchange have either been destroyed or rendered inaccessible due to persistent security threats. Consequently, many households have experienced declining incomes and increased economic vulnerability.

The findings also reveal that insecurity has had devastating consequences for agricultural production. This is particularly significant given that agriculture remains the primary source of livelihood for a large proportion of the population in Borno State and the wider Northeast. Frequent attacks on farming communities, displacement of rural populations, destruction of farmlands, and restrictions on access to agricultural land have significantly reduced food production. This finding aligns with reports from the United Nations Development Programme (2021), which identified insecurity as a major contributor to food insecurity and livelihood collapse in conflict-affected regions of Nigeria. The decline in agricultural productivity has not only affected local communities but has also contributed to rising food prices and inflationary pressures across the country.

Another important finding relates to the deterioration of social cohesion and community relations. A substantial proportion of respondents agreed that insurgency and insecurity have strained relationships among communities. Violent conflict often generates mistrust, suspicion, and fragmentation, particularly where communities perceive one another as being associated with armed groups or competing for limited resources. The displacement of populations and the destruction of social networks have further weakened traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution and communal cooperation. This finding supports earlier observations by Onuoha (2014), who argued that prolonged insurgency undermines social capital and weakens the social fabric necessary for sustainable peace.

The educational sector has also suffered significantly from the effects of insecurity. The study found that attacks on schools, fear of violence, and displacement have disrupted educational activities across affected areas. The closure of schools and the displacement of students and teachers have deprived thousands of young people of educational opportunities. The long-term implications of this trend are profound, as educational disruption undermines human capital development, reduces future employment prospects, and increases the likelihood of intergenerational poverty. This finding is particularly relevant given Boko Haram's historical opposition to Western education and its deliberate targeting of educational institutions.

Furthermore, the findings indicate that insecurity has discouraged both domestic and foreign investment. Investors generally seek stable and predictable environments in which to operate. The prevalence of terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, and communal violence has increased perceptions of risk

and uncertainty, thereby discouraging investment in affected regions. Reduced investment translates into fewer employment opportunities, lower economic growth, and slower infrastructural development. The World Bank (2020) similarly observed that insecurity remains one of the most significant barriers to sustainable economic development in Nigeria.

The study further reveals that the humanitarian consequences of insecurity have been severe. Large-scale displacement has disrupted livelihoods, weakened community structures, and increased dependence on humanitarian assistance. According to UNHCR reports, millions of people have been displaced across the Northeast as a result of insurgency-related violence. The displacement crisis has placed enormous pressure on host communities and public services, while simultaneously increasing poverty and social vulnerability among affected populations.

At the national level, the findings suggest that the cumulative effects of Boko Haram insurgency and banditry extend beyond the Northeast and constitute a significant threat to Nigeria's socioeconomic development. Resources that could have been invested in infrastructure, healthcare, education, and economic development have increasingly been diverted towards security operations and humanitarian responses. This reallocation of resources has reduced the state's capacity to address other pressing developmental challenges.

Overall, the findings demonstrate that the socioeconomic implications of Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, and insecurity are extensive and multidimensional. The crisis has disrupted economic production, weakened social cohesion, undermined educational development, discouraged investment, and exacerbated poverty and displacement. These outcomes highlight the interconnected nature of security and development and underscore the need for comprehensive strategies that address both the immediate manifestations of insecurity and the structural conditions that contribute to its persistence.

**Implication**

The research implied that the profound suffering caused by the Boko Haram insurgency in Borno State is an issue of worthy of national and global attention.. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) both women and children face psychological trauma, poor living conditions, and limited mental health support despite in Government provided center. This is profound issue that was raised during the study as Government efforts, such as the Violence Against Persons Prohibition Act, fall short in addressing victims' psychological and material needs, while corruption and unbureaucratic measures further hampers the effective relief distribution. Ultimately, victims in camps therefore lack of adequate food, clean water, sanitation, and healthcare, with some subjected to abuse and stigmatization.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, the Boko Haram insurgency and banditry have left a deep scars on the people and society of northern Nigeria and beyond. Lives have been uprooted, communities torn apart, and governance systems severely undermined. In the quest to end insecurity, it is the same as the quest for developments, as terrorism and terrorist organizations have been noted by many authorities in the international system to be seen in places of intense hunger, poverty and socioeconomic vulnerability. The paper therefore concludes that the ready market for terrorism in the Northern region of Nigeria, complicates the end of the insurgence in Nigeria, due to the fact that insecurity is an economic service and cannot thrive where the market does not support. Therefore, the communal members have to look beyond the political system and restrategize

**Recommendations**

To address the devastation caused by Boko Haram and other insecurity issues plaguing Borno State and Nigeria as a whole, a multifaceted approach to tackle the varying problems affecting the society. The conditioning of a society is what allows insecurity thrives or otherwise.So, first, Nigeria political leaders must increase its support for the military by strengthen regional security cooperation. Collaborating with neighboring countries through frameworks like the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) can help combat cross-border insurgency and curb the spread of violence beyond national borders, however the Country's military must first be capable of playing its part in joint task operations. Secondly, the rehabilitation and reintegration programs should be prioritized but there are valuable lessons to be learned from post-conflict recovery efforts in countries like Rwanda and Colombia, where former insurgents were reintegrated into society through education, support, and employment opportunities. Nigeria must create similar pathways for both former fighters and displaced persons to rebuild their lives, however wounds like loss of lives cannot be quantified and erased. So therefore there must be a justice in the reintegration process.

One major recommendation, to battling this insecurity is that the government must first defeat the economy of insecurity. This can be done by investing in social welfare such as education and livelihoods is also critical. Alternative schools,

vocational training centers, and supporting agricultural development will tackle the root causes of poverty and unemployment. Most people in the north abhor western education so if it comes in this form, there will be acceptability as this approach can offer hope and opportunity to those who might otherwise be drawn into insurgent activities out of desperation and deprivation.

Most importantly, the globalized world requires that national security architecture must be driven towards application of technology. As technology plays a vital role in improving security and helping law enforcement agencies and security agencies. Surveillance drones, early warning systems, and data analytics can significantly enhance the government's ability to prevent and respond to attacks more effectively. Finally, there is need for the establishment of psychosocial support systems such as trauma counseling centers and social support programs that can help victims of insurgency cope with the emotional and psychological toll of violence, fostering resilience and promoting social cohesion in communities torn apart by conflict.

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